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Abstract 
At first glance, conceptual representations (e.g., our internal notion of the object lemon) seem static; we have the 
impression that there is something that lemon “means” (a sour, yellow, football-shaped, citrus fruit) and that this 
meaning does not vary. Research in semantic memory has traditionally taken this “static” perspective. 
Consequently, only effects demonstrated across a variety of contexts have typically been considered informative 
regarding the architecture of the semantic system. In this review, we take the opposite approach. We review 
instances of context-dependent conceptual activation at many different timescales—from long-term experience, to 
recent experience, to current task goals, to the unfolding process of conceptual activation itself—and we suggest 
that the pervasive effects of context across all of these timescales indicate that rather than being static, conceptual 
representations are constantly changing and are inextricably linked to their contexts. 
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(0) Introduction 
Imagine a chef, searching a basket of fresh produce for a 
lemon with a perfectly yellow peel. Now imagine that same chef, 
carefully peeling the lemon with a special curved paring knife to 
form a “flower” garnish carved from the peel. When the chef 
thinks about a lemon in these two contexts, is she thinking about 
the same thing? Or does the information that she activates 
change depending upon the context? How constant, or “static”, 
are conceptual representations across contexts? And how 
constant are they across different people, and across time? Is a 
well-trained chef’s representation of a lemon, or a paring knife, 
different from yours or mine? One might suppose that semantic 
memory is essentially (1) “context-free” (a lemon surely has 
certain invariant properties the chef can rely on across contexts?), 
(2) independent of any specific event (isn’t a lemon that the chef 
slices up essentially the same thing as one that she peels?), and 
(3) shared (how else could the chef communicate about a lemon 
if it were not?). However, we believe that to understand the 
semantic system, our theories must incorporate explanations of 
those aspects of semantic memory which are neither context-free, 
nor independent of specific events, nor shared.  
Traditionally, to contrast semantic memory with the 
individual and specific experiences that make up episodic 
memory, psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists have 
indeed described semantic memory as “context-free”. And at 
first glance, conceptual representations (e.g., the concept of a 
lemon) do seem static—that is, we have the impression that 
there is something that lemon “means” (a sour, yellow, rugby 
ball-shaped, citrus fruit) and that this meaning does not vary, 
even when we think about it in different contexts. 
However, current accounts of conceptual knowledge allow 
for the possibility that conceptual representations are instead 
more dynamic. In these models, object concepts are multi-
dimensional representations that are distributed (in part) across 
brain regions that underlie sensory, perceptual, and motor 
function (e.g., Allport, 1985: Barsalou, 1999; Damasio, 1989)1. 
Thus, according to these “sensorimotor-based” accounts of 
semantic memory, the “meaning” of a lemon is not an 
indivisible whole, but is distributed across a range of featural 
dimensions (cf. McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg, 1997; Rogers & 
McClelland, 2004; Tyler & Moss, 2001; Vigliocco, Vinson, 
Levis & Garrett, 2004). Because of this distributed architecture, 
there is no impediment to certain features of a concept being 
more active than others (e.g., depending on the circumstances). 
Thus, a distributed architecture allows conceptual 
representations to be dynamically sensitive to context (for 
discussion, see Humphreys & Forde, 2001; Kiefer & Martens, 
2010; Schyns, Goldstone & Thibaut, 1998; Spivey, 2007). 
Despite the fact that current models of semantic memory 
suggest that conceptual representations can be dynamic, many 
empirical investigations into semantic memory still focus on the 
invariance of conceptual representation; the implicit (or, 
                                                
1 We focus in this review on object concepts, but we believe that the 
principles that we discuss should apply to abstract concepts too – in 
particular, we suspect that abstract concepts should be affected by 
context across multiple time scales. 
sometimes, explicit) assumption is that only effects that can be 
demonstrated across a variety of contexts should be considered 
informative with regards to the structure and organization of 
semantic memory. Here we take a very different perspective—
one in which context is instead a fundamental property of the 
structure of the semantic system. 
Of course, no one would deny that context influences 
conceptual processing – decades of semantic priming studies 
have shown just this (e.g., Barclay, Bransford, Franks, 
McCarrell & Nitsch, 1974; Meyer & Schvaneveldt 1971; 
Tabossi, 1988), and several authors have considered context 
effects and/or conceptual flexibility in the context of evaluating 
sensorimotor-based (or “embodied”) theories of conceptual 
representation (e.g., Dove, 2015; Hauk & Tschentscher, 2013; 
Kiefer & Pulvermuller, 2012; Mahon, 2015) and language 
processing (Taylor & Zwaan, 2009; Willems & Casasanto, 
2011). Our point is not simply that conceptual access changes 
with context. Instead, we contend that (as has been suggested in 
the context of traditional approaches to episodic memory [for 
review, see Schacter, 1995]) the concepts themselves are 
inextricably linked to contexts in which they appear; so much so 
that the dividing line between a concept and a context may be 
impossible to clearly make out (e.g., Barsalou, 1987; Casasanto 
& Lupyan, in press; Connell & Lynott, 2014; Elman, 2004; 
Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall & Barsalou, 2014; Prinz, 2002; Yee 
Chrysikou & Thompson-Schill, 2013). 
In this article we review evidence that conceptual 
representations are intertwined with context. The contexts that 
we describe (which are likely interdependent) include: (1) long-
term experience, (2) recent experience, (3) the concurrent 
context or on-going goals, and (4) the passage of time as the 
process of object recognition unfolds. Although we believe that 
context should really be conceptualized in more continuous 
terms, for expository purposes we describe it at these four 
discrete timescales. We also discuss an additional factor, (5) 
individual abilities, which we hypothesize may modulate the 
role of context generally.  
Finally, we will briefly review one theoretical framework 
in which all of these context effects are a natural consequence of 
how concepts are acquired and represented in the first place, and 
in which change over time is naturally accommodated. Although 
the context effects that we describe may be consistent with 
views in which context simply changes which aspects are 
activated of concepts that are fundamentally static, a static 
framework does not easily accommodate learning. Therefore, we 
suggest that a more parsimonious account is a dynamic 
framework in which a concept cannot be meaningfully separated 
from the context in which it is understood.  
(1) Long-term experience 
Does our well-trained chef have different representations 
for special cooking implements than a culinary novice? If she 
does, how did this come to be the case? It is generally accepted 
that the episodic memory system has a major role in acquiring 
semantic knowledge. But how does this acquisition process 
work? And is there a point when our concepts of things stop 
changing despite new episodes of experiencing them? 
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A fundamental prediction of sensorimotor-based theories is 
that an object’s conceptual representation includes the 
sensorimotor regions that are routinely active when that object is 
perceived or interacted with. This means that experiences with 
objects should shape representations, and as experience changes 
over time, representations should change as well. Moreover, 
given that different individuals have different experiences, 
conceptual representations should differ across individuals. 
However, few studies in the semantic memory literature have 
examined how individual differences in, or changes over, long-
term experience affect the representations of object concepts. In 
this first section we review some exceptions – studies showing 
that experience with objects shapes their conceptual 
representations. 
For instance, there is evidence that the manner of 
experience that one has had with an object, e.g., which hand is 
typically used to interact with it, affects conceptual 
representations: In right-handers, naming pictures of tools 
activates left premotor cortex more than in left-handers (but 
critically, there is no laterality difference for non-manipulable 
objects, e.g., animals; Kan, Kable, Van Scoyoc, Chatterjee & 
Thompson-Schill, 2006; see Willems, Hagoort & Casasanto, 
[2010] for an analogous finding when reading action verbs, such 
as write or throw). In addition to conceptual representations 
being affected by manner of manual experience, they also 
appear to be affected by the amount of manual experience: In a 
study that demonstrated that performing a concurrent manual 
task can selectively interfere with thinking about manually 
experienced objects (Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman & Thompson-
Schill, 2013—we describe this study further in section 3), we 
also showed that the amount of experience that an individual has 
had with an object predicts how much disruption they will 
experience from the manual task. This suggests that manual 
experience shapes the conceptual representation of manually 
experienced objects. Similarly, ratings of lifetime tactile 
experience with objects have been shown to correlate with the 
degree to which a brain region involved in object-related action 
(left parietal cortex) becomes active when making judgments 
about the objects’ shape (Oliver, Geiger, Lewandowski & 
Thompson-Schill, 2009). 
Other types of long-term experience can also affect 
conceptual representations. In professional musicians, for 
example, identifying pictures of musical instruments activates 
auditory association cortex and adjacent areas more than 
pictures of other objects (while no such difference is observed 
for musical lay people; Hoenig et al., 2011). Analogous findings 
have been reported for experience playing sports: Reading 
sentences describing actions associated with ice-hockey (but not 
sentences describing everyday experience) activates premotor 
regions more in ice hockey players than in non-players (Beilock, 
Lyons, Mattarella-Micke, Nusbaum & Small, 2008). 
Even without years of training, differences in sensorimotor 
experience can produce differences in an object’s conceptual 
representation. For instance, Kiefer, Sim, Liebich, Hauk & 
Tanaka, (2007) have shown that after being trained for three 
weeks to classify novel objects while either pointing at the 
objects or pantomiming actions towards them, participants in the 
pantomime, but not the pointing group, showed early activity in 
motor regions and later activity in occipito-parietal visual-motor 
regions. This was the case even though the task was simply to 
make a category judgment on written names of the novel objects. 
This, and related studies (Oliver, Parsons & Thompson-Schill, 
2008; Weisberg, Turennout & Martin, 2007), suggest that even 
shorter-term differences in sensorimotor experience can have a 
measurable impact on an object’s conceptual representation.  
The findings that we have described in this section may 
seem problematic. If one’s concept of e.g., a lemon, changes 
with long-term experience, then no two individuals’ concepts of 
lemons will be exactly the same. And further, your own concept 
of a lemon might change subtly (or, in some cases, less subtly) 
over time, without your being consciously aware of the change. 
Yet we contend that this is, in fact, what happens, and that (as 
we will argue later) this is not as much of a problem as it might 
at first seem. 
(2) Recent experience 
We now turn to work suggesting that if our chef had 
recently been searching for a lemon among the limes in her 
produce basket, the way she subsequently thinks about lemons 
(and other colorful things) would be different than if she had 
recently been squeezing lemons for lemonade. In other words, 
conceptual activation can be influenced by recent experience. 
For instance, van Dantzig and colleagues (2008) have 
shown that the modality to which attention is directed 
immediately prior to thinking about objects can affect 
conceptual activation: Between trials that required participants 
to make true-false judgments on sentences referring to object 
properties (e.g., broccoli is green or soup is hot), participants 
responded to either a visual light, an auditory noise, or a tactile 
vibration; property judgments were faster when the modality to 
which the sentence referred was the same as the preceding 
perceptual stimulus. Along similar lines, but using a more 
implicit measure of conceptual activation, Bermeitinger, 
Wentura and Frings (2011) found that when an independent task 
directing attention to shape was interspersed with a semantic 
priming task, priming for words referring to natural kinds (for 
which shape is known to be a particularly important feature) was 
greater than priming for artifacts. In contrast, priming was 
greater for artifacts (for which action is known to be a 
particularly important feature) than for natural kinds when the 
interspersed task directed attention to action. By interspersing a 
task that directs attention to one modality or another with a task 
that requires conceptual activation, these two studies show that 
directing attention to a particular modality changes subsequent 
conceptual activation such that information related to that 
modality is activated more easily (for related behavioral findings, 
see Martens, Ansorge, & Kiefer, 2011; Van Dam, 
Rueschemeyer, Lindemann & Bekkering, 2010; for related fMRI 
findings, see Hoenig, Sim, Bochev, Herrnberger & Kiefer, 2008; 
Mummery, Patterson, Hodges, & Price, 1998; Phillips, 
Noppeney, Humphreys, Price, 2002; Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, 
D’Esposito, & Farah, 1999; Rogers, Hocking, Mechelli, 
Patterson, & Price, 2005; Van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering & 
Rueschemeyer, 2012; for review, see Willems & Francken, 
2012).  
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Conceptual activation can also be influenced by whether 
one initially heard the sound that it makes vs. its name. For 
example, hearing “cat” facilitates subsequent judgments about 
whether an image of a cat is upright or upside down relative to 
hearing the sound of a cat meowing, or the word “meow” 
(Lupyan & Thompson-Schill, 2012)—perhaps because thinking 
about the noise that something makes focuses attention on a 
relatively limited part of its conceptual representation (e.g., 
features relating to that noise), whereas hearing the label may 
produce broader activation (i.e., of multiple features, including 
those which support an orientation judgment).  
Perhaps surprisingly, there is also evidence that the 
modality to which attention has recently been directed can have 
a more lingering influence (e.g., from a prior task, rather than 
just from a prior trial) on conceptual activation: Although 
lemons and daffodils overlap on the dimension of color (both are 
yellow), and might therefore be expected to partially activate 
one another due to having overlapping conceptual 
representations, the word “lemon” does not ordinarily prime 
“daffodil”. Yet, it can prime “daffodil” if participants’ attention 
has been focused on color in a prior task involving unrelated 
items (e.g., color words in a Stroop task; Yee Ahmed & 
Thompson-Schill, 2012). Similar findings have been reported in 
other modalities. For example, Pecher, Zeelenberg and 
Raaijmakers (1998) observed shape priming (e.g., the word 
“coin” priming the word “button”) only when, prior to the 
priming experiment, participants made shape judgments about 
the objects to which the words referred. Thus, recent experience 
can linger long enough to affect conceptual activation in a 
subsequent, unrelated task.  
Simply having recently seen a picture of an object can also 
affect its subsequent activation: Targets categorically related to 
primes that had been recently seen (in a pre-scanning picture 
naming task), produced more fMRI-adaptation than targets 
related to primes that had not been recently seen (Gotts,  
Milleville & Martin, in press). One interpretation of this finding 
(related to what we suggested above regarding hearing an object 
named) is that labeling an object leads to a more 
abstract/modality-neutral instantiation of its representation 
compared to simply viewing it, and that such instantiations tend 
to overlap more with categorically related items. But whatever 
the reason, prior identification influences conceptual activation 
several minutes later in a subsequent task. 
The studies described in this section show that recent 
experience (whether it be immediately prior to conceptual 
activation, or several minutes before) that directs attention to 
either a particular modality, or to no modality in particular, can 
influence conceptual activation. One could interpret these 
findings as a more mundane demonstration of the effects of 
attention to different features of an otherwise static concept; 
however (as we will describe in section 6), we subscribe to the 
view that it is more appropriate to think of the concept itself as 
changing slightly each time it is retrieved, and that there is no 
real demarcation between what is activated in a given instance, 
and the concept itself.   
(3) The concurrent context or on-going goals (i.e., 
task) 
Perceptual properties such as shape and color are 
particularly relevant when searching for a specific object (e.g., a 
lemon in a basket of produce). But, as alluded to in the 
introduction, there may be other tasks where form is less 
relevant, and function more so (e.g., when the goal is to cut the 
lemon). In this section, we describe some studies that show how 
the immediate context or current goals can influence the overall 
degree to which different types of conceptual features become 
active.  
For example, there is evidence that the immediate visual 
context can affect conceptual retrieval: If an object is depicted in 
a context consistent with its use (e.g., a kitchen timer on the 
counter next to a pot of food bubbling on the stove), the action 
associated with using the object is more readily available than 
when the same object is depicted in a context consistent with 
picking it up (e.g., when the timer is in a kitchen drawer; 
Kalénine, Shapiro, Flumini, Borghi, & Buxbaum, 2014)2. There 
is also neural evidence that surrounding objects can influence 
conceptual activation. In an fMRI study, Hsu, Kraemer, Oliver, 
Schlichting & Thompson-Schill (2011) asked participants to 
judge which of two objects a third object most resembled in 
color. When the three objects were all from the same color 
category (e.g., butter, egg yolk, and school bus are all yellow), 
and thus the task context required retrieving detailed color 
knowledge, the neural response overlapped more with brain 
regions involved in color perception (the left fusiform) than 
when two of the three objects were from different color 
categories (e.g., one red and two yellow objects) and thus less 
detailed color knowledge was necessary. This finding is 
particularly interesting because it implies that the degree of 
perceptual resolution required by the task may influence the 
extent to which brain areas that support perception are involved: 
A task that requires a high degree of perceptual resolution 
involves perceptual areas more than a task that can be performed 
on the basis of more categorical (or abstracted) knowledge. Thus, 
conceptual knowledge may be represented at multiple levels of 
abstraction (for discussion, see Thompson-Schill 2003; Binder 
& Desai 2011). We return to this idea in section 7.   
Conceptual activation can also be affected by whatever 
else we happen to be doing at the same time (and this is not 
simply because multi-tasking is difficult). For instance, we have 
shown that performing a concurrent manual task that is 
incompatible with how a given object is acted upon can interfere 
                                                
2 The way the object is oriented can also be important: How an object is 
grasped for use can be activated by a picture of that object (e.g., a beer 
mug with a handle; Tucker & Ellis, 1998), but only if the pictured 
object is oriented in a way that is consistent with the object’s function 
(Masson & Bud, 2011). 
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with thinking about that object3. That is, if, while naming 
pictures, participants had to concurrently perform a sequence of 
hand motions that were incompatible with those used to interact 
with frequently manipulated objects, picture naming was more 
disrupted for objects that are typically interacted with manually 
than objects that are less frequently interacted with manually 
(e.g., there was relatively more interference for pencils vs. 
tigers; Yee et al., 2013; see also Witt, Kemmerer, Linkenauger, 
& Culham, 2010). Thus, the context of a concurrent manual task 
interfered with people’s ability to access manipulation features 
of objects. This demonstrates not only that manipulation 
information is part of the representation of frequently 
manipulated objects, but also that our ability to access a given 
object depends on the match between our mental representation 
of that object’s meaning and what we are doing at the moment. 
We return to this issue in section 7, when we consider the 
argument that (contrary to what these data suggest) sensorimotor 
information, rather than being part of a concept, is accessed only 
incidentally during conceptual retrieval (for discussion see 
Mahon & Caramazza 2008; Chatterjee, 2010). 
Moving beyond action, a concurrent task can also interfere 
with accessing knowledge about visual or auditory properties of 
objects. While holding in memory a sequence of three auditory 
tones, participants had more trouble verifying an auditory 
property of an object (e.g., blenders can be loud) than a visual 
property (e.g., lemons can be yellow). Furthermore, the 
complementary pattern was observed when holding in mind a 
sequence of three meaningless visual shapes (Vermeulen, 
Corneille & Niedenthal, 2008).  
Similarity, conceptual activation can be influenced by the 
relationship between the meaning of a given concept and the 
modality emphasized by the current task: In an elegant study, 
Connell & Lynott (2014b) showed that a task that implicitly 
focuses attention on the visual modality (visual lexical decision) 
facilitates access to words referring to properties or things that 
are frequently experienced visually (e.g., the concept 
corresponding to the term small is rated as experienced more by 
seeing than is the concept corresponding to the term husky). In 
contrast, a task that implicitly focuses attention more on the 
auditory modality (reading aloud) facilitates access to words 
referring to properties or things that that are more frequently 
experienced auditorily (e.g., the concept corresponding to the 
term husky is rated as experienced more by hearing than is the 
concept corresponding to the term small).  
                                                
3 Note that there is an important difference between procedures that 
lead to facilitation (such as those described in the section 2) and those 
that lead to interference. When a prior perceptual or motor task draws a 
participant’s attention to a given modality, but does not continue to 
place task demands on the participant during a subsequent conceptual 
task, access to conceptual information in that modality can be facilitated 
(because the task drew attention to the modality but is not occupying 
resources in that modality). In contrast, in the concurrent tasks we 
describe here, the perceptual or motor task is on-going (and thus 
occupying resources) while the concept is being accessed. This leads to 
interference in cases where the concurrent task shares resource with 
those that involved in representing the concept in question (see Connell 
& Lynott, 2012). 
The studies we have described in this section make clear 
that both on-going goals (i.e., the task) and the concurrent 
context can influence conceptual activation (for related 
discussion, see Connell & Lynott, 2014a). These context effects 
suggest that conceptual representations are distributed across 
features such that different features can become more or less 
active in different circumstances. More broadly, because altering 
the task or goals routinely alters conceptual activation, the 
findings imply that there is in fact no such thing as task-
independent conceptual activation. 
In other words, although in the lexical processing and 
semantic memory literatures, context is usually regarded as a 
means of evoking a particular, stable, sense of a word or concept 
(e.g., Swinney, 1979; Tabossi, 1988; Zwaan, Stanfield & Yaxley, 
2002), in other domains, such as the study of episodic memory, 
context is understood as a continually varying signal that is 
always operating to affect cognition (e.g., Polyn Norman & 
Kahana, 2009). That is, there is never “no context” or even 
“neutral context”, as one might assume by reading the semantic 
memory literature. Instead, we should consider the idea that 
concepts cannot be meaningfully separated from the contexts in 
which they appear.  
One corollary of this last idea is that concepts which are 
associated with more similar contexts should have activation 
profiles that are more similar across contexts than do concepts 
associated with more dissimilar contexts. A recent fMRI study 
suggests that this is the case: a corpus-based measure of the 
diversity of the contexts in which a word appears in language 
(which can be taken as a measure of variability in conceptual 
representation) predicts the variability in the neural response to 
that word across three random presentation contexts. That is, 
words that, in corpora, appear in less diverse contexts elicit a 
less variable response across presentations than words that 
appear in more diverse contexts (Musz & Thompson-Schill, in 
press; cf. Rodriguez-Ferreiro, Gennari, Davies & Cuetos, 2011). 
This result not only highlights that a word’s neural 
representation is not static, but also that the representations of 
some words, and therefore the concepts to which they refer, may 
be more variable than others. 
 (4) The passage of time as object recognition 
unfolds 
Does a quick glance at a lemon (perhaps as you hurry 
through the produce section of the grocery store) result in a 
different lemon being activated than a lingering look? Does the 
lemon being activated change as your lingering look proceeds? 
Our and others’ work suggests that the answer to both of these 
questions is yes. That is, during the process of object recognition, 
conceptual activation changes dynamically, with different 
features becoming active at different rates.  
For example, we have found evidence that during visual 
object identification, information about the form of an object 
(e.g., that knives are oblong) becomes available sooner than 
information about the function (or purpose of use, e.g., that they 
are used for cutting; Yee, Huffstetler & Thompson-Schill, 2011). 
Specifically, in a ‘visual world’ eyetracking study (Cooper, 
1974; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard & Sedivy, 1995), 
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we found that when participants were briefly exposed (for 1 
second) to an array of four objects and asked to click on the 
object corresponding to a heard word, they were sensitive to the 
fact that, at the conceptual level, one of the other objects in the 
display was similar in shape to that of the named object. For 
example, when they heard the target word “Frisbee”, they 
looked at a slice of pizza (another object that can be round). 
Importantly, shape similarity was not apparent in the visual 
depictions (e.g., a slice of pizza is triangular, a shape that a 
Frisbee cannot take); thus, preferential fixations on the shape-
related object were attributable to activation of conceptual shape 
information (and not to the current input to the senses). 
However with the same 1-second exposure to the array, we 
found no preferential fixations on objects related in “function” to 
the named object. For example, when participants heard the 
word “tape”, they did not preferentially fixate on a bottle of glue. 
Yet when exposure to the array was lengthened to 2 seconds (the 
task was otherwise identical), we observed the opposite 
pattern—participants preferentially fixated on the function-
related object, but not the shape-related object.  Thus, these 
findings suggest that visual object recognition is a dynamically 
unfolding process in which function follows form.  
Other studies using the visual world paradigm have also 
found that function information becomes active after other, 
arguably more perceptually available, aspects of conceptual 
knowledge. For instance, knowledge about the thematic 
relationships that an object can participate in (e.g., the 
knowledge that a broom is often paired with [and therefore seen 
with] a dustpan, or that a steak is paired/seen with a knife), and 
knowledge about an object’s structural characteristics  (its shape, 
size and volume) appear to become available more rapidly and 
more transiently than information about its function (see 
Kalénine, Mirman, Middleton & Buxbaum, 2012 for thematic 
and Lee, Middleton, Mirman, Kalénine & Buxbaum, 2013 for 
structural).  
Future work will be needed to learn the cause(s) of this 
chronology. One possibility is that because information about 
the purpose for which an object is used is not directly available 
via the senses, accessing this information requires more 
processing (and thus more time) than accessing perceptual 
information. Another possibility is that in the studies reviewed 
above, perceptual information has special status because the 
visual world paradigm task—essentially a visual search task—
requires attending to perceptual information. A third 
(compatible) possibility is that presenting stimuli in the visual 
modality (regardless of whether the task is visual search) places 
emphasis on visual information. 
Semantic priming studies using written words provide a 
hint that the modality of the stimulus, rather than the visual 
search task per se, plays a role in perceptual information’s 
precedence. First, a few semantic priming studies using written 
words have tested whether responses to a target word are 
facilitated when preceded by a shape-related prime word. 
Although results have been mixed (see the Pecher et al., 1998 
study described in section 2) several studies did obtain evidence 
of shape priming (Flores d’Arcais, Schreuder, & Glazenborg, 
1985; Schreuder, Flores D'Arcais, & Glazenborg, 1984). 
Intriguingly, these studies also included prime-target pairs 
related on a more abstract dimension (similar to 
function/purpose of use, e.g., apple-banana, or stapler-paperclip) 
and found evidence that priming based on this 
abstract/functional dimension emerges more reliably at long, 
rather than short interstimulus intervals, whereas priming based 
on shape relatedness was larger at short than long interstimulus 
intervals (Flores d’Arcais et al., 1985; Schreuder et al., 1985).  
Along the same lines, when reading sentences referring to 
objects (e.g., a calculator), information that is directly available 
from perceiving the object (e.g., the grasp that one would use to 
pick up a calculator to move it) becomes less active over time, 
while information that requires more abstract knowledge about 
the purpose of the object (e.g., the finger poke that one would 
use to operate a calculator) becomes more active over time (Bub 
& Masson, 2010). 
Subscribers to a “static” model of conceptual 
representations might not agree that the reason that perceptual 
information becomes active early is because written words, like 
visual objects, place emphasis on the visual modality. Instead, 
they might interpret the findings that we have described so far as 
indicating that irrespective of context, perceptual information 
becomes active first during conceptual activation (perhaps 
because it is dominant during the extremely frequent behavior of 
object recognition). However, as we describe next, when stimuli 
are presented in other modalities, perceptual information does 
not always become active first, suggesting that stimulus 
modality indeed affects the dynamics of featural activation. 
In a cross-modal semantic priming study in which primes 
were auditory words (targets were visual), priming for visually 
related targets was observed, but it was delayed in time relative 
to priming for targets related to the typical use of the prime4 
(Moss, McCormick & Tyler, 1997). Another study that 
presented object names auditorily obtained analogous results—
information that is directly available from viewing the object 
(here, information about how one grasps an object to move it) 
became active later and for a shorter duration than information 
about how an object is manipulated in order to use it – i.e., its 
function (Bub & Masson, 2012). Thus, in contrast to when 
primes are visual, when the primes (or the sole presented words) 
are auditory, activation of perceptual information can appear 
later than functional information (see Garcea & Mahon, 2012 for 
related work).  
Taken together, the pattern across studies suggests that as 
the process of object recognition proceeds, some types of 
featural information become active earlier than others, and may 
also decay more quickly. Moreover, the ebb and flow of 
different features seems to be influenced by the relationship 
between the modality of the stimulus and the specific feature: 
When the stimulus is presented visually, visual features may 
become active earlier than more abstract knowledge (e.g., 
relating to purpose of use). In contrast, when the stimulus is 
                                                
4 Perceptually related targets were primarily visible parts of the prime 
or what the prime is typically made of (e.g., blouse-button or sandal-
leather), while use-related targets typically denoted the primary purpose 
of the prime or the location in which the prime is used (e.g., blouse-
wear; satchel-school; radio-music). 
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presented auditorily, the reverse pattern has been observed5. 
Thus, the dynamics of featural activation during object 
recognition appears to depend upon the modality (i.e., the 
context) in which the concept is presented. This, together with 
evidence (reviewed in sections 1-3) that conceptual activation is 
affected by long-term experience, recent experience, and current 
goals, suggests that rather than being fixed, concepts change 
from one context to another. 
(5) Individual abilities 
So far, we have described evidence demonstrating that 
context can have an influence on conceptual activation at many 
different timescales (which we have suggested are probably 
better conceptualized in more continuous terms). However, we 
have not yet considered (1) whether factors intrinsic to the 
individual, such as individual differences in cognitive 
abilities/processing styles might impact an individual’s 
conceptual processing in general, or (2) whether such factors 
might impact the extent to which a given individual is sensitive 
to contextual modulation. In this section we speculate about 
some individual factors which we hypothesize may affect both 
conceptual processing and the influence of context on such 
processing.   
First, we consider whether individual differences in 
processing preferences (e.g., preferring to process stimuli 
visually vs. verbally) might impact conceptual activation. For 
instance, the same study that found that retrieving detailed color 
knowledge about objects produces activity in color perception 
brain regions (Hsu et al., 2011) also reported a correlation 
between activity in a color perception brain region and the 
extent to which participants reported preferring to process 
information more visually (relative to verbally, as measured by a 
questionnaire; Kirby, Moore & Schofield, 1988). Similarly, 
Kraemer, Rosenberg & Thompson-Schill (2009) found that 
given a similarity judgment task that can be completed either by 
remembering a written list of features (e.g., red, striped circle), 
or by converting that list into a visual image of the object, 
participants who reported a more verbal cognitive style showed 
more activity in a brain region associated with phonological 
processing (supramarginal gyrus), whereas participants who 
reported a more visual style showed more activity in a brain 
region associated with visual object processing (fusiform gyrus). 
These findings suggest that conceptual processing may be 
influenced by individual preferences to attend to one modality vs. 
another. 
Another study that we have already described (in section 3) 
is also consistent with the hypothesis that individual differences 
in processing preferences may affect conceptual activation. In 
the semantic priming study in which “lemon” only primed 
“daffodil” if participants’ attention had been focused on color in 
a prior, ostensibly unrelated Stroop task, we observed that 
individual differences in the ability to selectively focus on color 
in the Stroop task predicted the amount of priming. This 
                                                
5Task may also interact with which features become available when: 
Rogers and Patterson (2007) have shown that when the task is 
categorization, perceptual information seems to become available 
earlier than more general information.  
relationship could reflect differences in the degree to which 
people attend to or perceive color (as in Hsu et al., 2011): 
Individuals who attend to color more would more strongly 
associate conceptual color with both color words (e.g., green) 
and with the names of objects (e.g., cucumber).  
However, another compatible possibility relates to 
selective attention: The general ability to selectively attend to 
one dimension at the expense of others (e.g., to focus on a 
word’s font color while ignoring its meaning) is an aspect of 
cognitive control (Posner & Snyder, 1975), and varies across 
individuals. Thus, a high capacity for selective attention could 
manifest as enhanced selective attention to features most 
relevant for the current task, (in this case, judging animal status), 
and hence less activation of other features (e.g., color).  
This account is particularly interesting because it is 
consistent with the proposal that cognitive control regulates the 
ability to selectively attend to task-relevant features of a concept 
in general (see Kan & Thompson-Schill, 2004a; Thompson-
Schill, Bedny & Goldberg, 2005). Evidence consistent with this 
account comes from a recent study demonstrating that inhibitory 
electrical stimulation over left prefrontal cortex (a brain region 
that supports cognitive control) interferes with the ability to 
categorize objects according to a specific attribute (e.g., round or 
red things) relative to categorizing objects at a more general 
level (e.g., things that hold water; (Lupyan, Mirman, Hamilton 
& Thompson-Schill, 2012; for related work, see also Kan & 
Thompson-Schill, 2004b; Lupyan & Mirman, 2013; Chrysikou 
et al., 2013). 
If individual processing preferences or cognitive control 
abilities indeed affect the extent to which conceptual activation 
is affected by context, then concepts must vary, not only from 
one context to another, but also within a given context, from one 
person to another. This underscores that concepts cannot be 
meaningfully separated from the contexts (including the 
individuals) in which they are understood. 
(6) Emergent representations and contextually-
bound concepts 
In the preceding sections we focused on how conceptual 
representations and their activation can be affected by long-term 
experience (section 1), recent experience and the concurrent 
context or on-going task (sections 2 and 3), the passage of time 
as object recognition unfolds (section 4), and individual 
differences in cognitive function (section 5). At first glance, 
these may seem like disparate influences, and a full account of 
how these are in fact part of the same contextual dynamic is 
beyond the scope of this article. However, below, we will briefly 
review an approach to the development of conceptual 
representations in which there is little theoretical separation 
between these influences (with the exception of individual 
abilities, which we address later). This approach helps explain 
how, in the face of different experiences, individuals are able to 
understand each other when they use conventionalized labels 
(your meaning of “kite” is not so different from mine even if 
you are a kite surfer and I have never been out on water). It also 
naturally accommodates learning, and along the way, explains 
why conceptual representations are inherently “fuzzy”, with no 
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context-free “core”. The account leads to many of the same 
properties of a conceptual system that are outlined by Connell & 
Lynott (2014a), and is compatible with related, more neurally-
oriented accounts (e.g., Damasio, 1989; Pulvermuller, 1999; 
Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Patterson, Nestor & Rogers, 2007; 
Binder & Desai, 2011), and with earlier cognitive accounts (e.g., 
McCloskey & Glucksberg 1979; Malt & Johnson, 1989). 
However, it adds a mechanistic explanation for how conceptual 
organization becomes the way it is. 
Within the emergentist approach to cognitive development 
(e.g., Elman et al., 1996) and conceptual representations (e.g., 
Rogers & McClelland, 2004), long-term knowledge is an 
emergent representation abstracted across multiple experiences. 
In one implementation of a small component of development, 
Elman (1990, 1993) showed how knowledge about, e.g., a word 
(although the same principles can apply to a concept) could be 
conceived of as the accumulation of knowledge about the 
contexts in which that word can occur. A key point is that this 
type of model “keeps track” of systematic variation in the input, 
such that idiosyncratic things that happen when in the presence 
of a lemon (such as a dog barking, or a cloud moving overhead) 
would have minimal impact on its developing representation, 
whereas things that happen more systematically in the presence 
of lemons (e.g., if in most of your experiences with lemons you 
squeeze them) would be more likely to become part of the 
representation. Thus, long-term knowledge would be stored in a 
substrate that would gradually change with experience (see 
Altmann, 1997, for details of how the learning process in Elman 
[1990, 1993] could lead a concept to be abstracted across 
experience). 
In this model there is thus no representational distinction 
between knowledge of something and knowledge of the contexts 
in which that thing occurs. In other words, while some accounts 
distinguish between types (or “concepts”) and tokens (the 
instantiation of a concept in a particular episode), the 
emergentist account distinguishes these only to the extent that 
one (types) is the abstraction, across multiple experiences, of the 
other (tokens).  
A critical insight implemented in these early emergentist 
models was that the state of the cognitive system at any one 
moment in time is a function of its accumulated experience, its 
current input (whatever in the environment attention is directed 
towards), and information about consecutively prior internal 
states of the cognitive system (via recurrence across time). The 
benefit of recurrence is that it allows for sequencing – for 
example, the knowledge we have about lemons that they should 
be cut before squeezed. (It also allows for abstraction over 
sequences as required in language acquisition, where language is 
an inherently sequenced input.) Thus, a recurrent architecture 
allows structure to be encoded across time. 
Within such a framework, conceptual activation is simply 
the flow of activation (both excitatory and inhibitory) through a 
network of connections that cumulatively reflect prior 
experience. This notion of conceptual activation explains the 
contextual dynamics we have discussed in the preceding 
sections: Long term experience (section 1) not only gradually 
organizes the substrate in which knowledge is represented, it 
also influences the flow of activation due to the current input, 
just as shorter term contextual experience (section 2) will also 
influence that flow. The concurrent context and task goals 
(section 3) either influence the input directly (the concurrent 
context is the input, if not in the current time, in preceding 
moments of time that have already changed the internal state of 
the system) or indirectly via top-down control of information 
flow (see Cohen, Aston-Jones, & Gilzenrat, 2004, for an 
example of task-directed “gating” in a similar framework). 
An important property of dynamical models with 
recurrence through time is that input is not apprehended in a 
single ‘step’, but rather unfolds across time (cf. section 4) – both 
as a property of the signal if it changes across time (e.g., speech) 
and, critically, as a property of the internal dynamics of such 
systems. Even for inputs that do not appear to change across 
time (e.g., when apprehending a slice of pizza), connectivity 
between regions of the network will mean that different parts of 
it (encoding, e.g., shape or function) will likely become 
activated at different times as a function of internal network 
dynamics, the temporal properties of the input, and top-down 
control. And within this framework, the kinds of individual 
differences we describe (section 5) could arise when the control 
of information flow through one part of the network or another 
is more or less tightly regulated, perhaps as a function of 
“cognitive control” (e.g., Frith, 2000; Mechelli, Price, Friston, 
Ishai, 2004; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Cohen et al., 2004; 
Noppeney, Price, Friston & Penny, 2006). 
More generally, this dynamical framework predicts that 
conceptual knowledge, categories, and “types” can be no more 
invariant than the contexts over which they have been abstracted, 
and thus, contrary to the traditional definition of semantic 
memory as context free, it blurs the distinction between the 
content of concepts and context. And yet, the framework also 
predicts that to the extent that people can share experiences (e.g., 
seeing kites in the sky), they can also share labels for those 
experiences (my label “kite” is the same as your label “kite”). 
Critically, although many experiences are shared, others are 
distinctive, with the former enabling a common labeling system, 
and the latter producing different conceptual systems across 
individuals. 
(7) Sensorimotor information: Part of, or peripheral 
to, concepts? 
We return, finally, to an issue raised in section 3: Is 
sensorimotor information a constituent part of the 
representations of concrete objects? It is worth noting that in the 
emergentist framework outlined above (see section 6), not only 
is there no distinction between the knowledge of what something 
is and the contexts in which that thing occurred, there is also no 
distinction between some “core” part of the knowledge of 
something and some other more “peripheral” part. Knowledge 
differs only insofar as it captures different contingencies 
between individual experiences and the generalizations formed 
on the basis of those individual experiences. Thus, in such a 
framework, the distinction between “part of” vs. “incidental to” 
is not meaningful (Elman, 2009). Nevertheless, because this is a 
persistent issue within the semantic memory literature, we 
consider the evidence below.  
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Numerous studies (some reviewed above) have 
demonstrated that thinking about a concrete object produces 
activation in brain regions putatively involved in action upon or 
perceiving that object. But there is general agreement that, on 
some theoretical models at least (although not on the one 
described in section 6), such activations could, in principle, be 
incidental to the activation of an amodal (or ‘disembodied’) 
concept, rather than part of it (for discussion see Mahon & 
Caramazza 2008, Anderson & Spivey 2009, Chatterjee, 2010). 
One often-cited fact that has been pointed to as evidence that 
such activations are only incidental is that there exist patients 
with motor or sensory deficits who, despite having difficulty 
performing, e.g., object-related actions, can retain the ability to 
name, and may also be able to describe the use of objects with 
strongly associated actions. Such intact abilities have been taken 
as evidence that such individuals have intact conceptual 
knowledge and thus, that sensory or motor information is not 
part of conceptual knowledge (see Negri et al., 2007).  
However, as we have reviewed in the introduction, 
distributed models of semantic memory posit that conceptual 
representations can include many different components (e.g., 
visual, auditory, and olfactory as well as action-oriented and 
multi-modal) that are distributed across cortex. Moreover, 
conceptual information may be represented at multiple levels of 
abstraction, and thus, depending upon the context, conceptual 
activation may involve the activation of some levels more than 
others (Hsu et al., 2011). For these reasons (as we and others, 
e.g., Taylor & Zwaan, 2009 have described previously), having 
difficulty accessing part of a representation would not be 
expected to result in catastrophic conceptual loss (although 
depending upon the task, some impairment may be detectable)—
just as losing one finger does not entail losing use of the entire 
hand. In other words, “brain damage leading to problems 
performing an action with a particular object does not entail 
difficulty recognizing that object…the object may be 
recognizable on the basis of other aspects of its representation 
(and the extent to which there are other aspects to rely upon may 
vary across individuals)” (Yee et al., 2013). Indeed, this is one 
of the theoretical advantages of a parallel distributed systems 
approach (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986) such as that 
described in section 6. 
In fact, even access to information that is specifically 
related to the affected modality may be delayed rather than 
entirely lost (e.g., Myung et al., 2010; Lee, Mirman & Buxbaum, 
2014). Thus, although individuals with sensory or motor deficits 
should have different representations of some concepts relative 
to unimpaired individuals, these differences may not be 
detectable at the relatively coarse grain of a naming, matching, 
or description task. And in fact, many studies have demonstrated 
that conceptual information can be more difficult to access when 
sensorimotor systems are impaired or interfered with in some 
way, for example, via neural stimulation (Pobric, Jefferies & 
Lambon Ralph, 2010), a concurrent task (e.g., Yee et al., 2013), 
or brain damage (e.g., the delays observed in Myung et al., 2010 
& in Lee et al., 2014; impaired naming, as in Trumpp, Kliese, 
Hoenig, Haarmeier & Kiefer, 2012; Herrera, Rodríguez-Ferreiro 
& Cueto, 2012; for review, see Gainotti, 2000).  
 (8) Summary 
Collectively, the studies we have reviewed suggest that 
conceptual representations are fluid, changing not only as a 
function of context as it relates to stimulus modality and task, 
but also as a function of the context that an individual brings 
with them—via their recent experience or long-term experience, 
or even via their neural degeneration, processing preferences, or 
abilities. 
We contend that the various changes that concepts can 
undergo in all of these contexts are not “noise” to be controlled 
away, but rather provide important clues about the architecture 
of the semantic system. Putting all of these dynamic effects 
together creates a (moving) picture that is naturally 
accommodated by a semantic system that is (1) experience-
based such that it allows representations to change over time, 
and (2) distributed such that various features can become active 
at different rates, in different circumstances.  
It may seem that if what is retrieved from semantic 
memory is so variable across time and individuals, 
communication should be difficult. However, as noted in section 
6, there are significant commonalities in human experience (and 
especially within a given culture) that would lead our 
representations (and our labels) to be similar enough for most 
practical purposes. Moreover, how often does communication 
require that the interlocutors be activating the exact same 
conceptual representations (for further consideration of this 
point, see Taylor & Zwaan, 2009; Connell & Lynott, 2014a; 
Casasanto & Lupyan, in press)? In fact, given that 
communication often requires clarification (“no, no, no… that’s 
not a beet, it’s a turnip!6”), it should not be difficult to come to 
terms with the idea that concepts can differ across individuals.  
Finally, we contend that the features over which we have 
described context exerting its influence are not arbitrary. Given 
that the dimensions over which we experience objects (and 
events and actions) are constrained by our senses, it is inevitable 
that our concepts are constructed via experiencing objects 
through (and integrating across) these senses.  Importantly, 
however, this is not to say that the content of the conceptual 
system is purely sensory: Abstraction, i.e., representing higher 
order contingencies across time and, critically, across contexts, 
is a critical aspect of the semantic system. And abstraction must 
occur across experiences at multiple levels and across multiple 
time frames. Thus, concepts, as abstractions, necessarily change 
as contexts change. In other words, just as our interactions with 
objects in the world are defined by the contexts in which they 
are embedded, so is the conceptual system in which these 
objects are represented.  
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